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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
AMMONETA SEQUOYAH, RICHARD CROWE ) 
GILLIAM JACKSON, individually and ) 
representing other Cherokee Indians) 
similarly situated; the EASTERN ) 
BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS; and the ) 
UNITED KETOOAH BAND OF CHEROKEE ) 
INDIANS, ) 
) 
Appellants, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, ) 
) 
Appellee. ) 
------~----------------------------) 
NO. 79-1633 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
AND SUGGESTION FOR 
REHEARING EN BANC UNDER 
RULES 35(B) and 40 
REQUIRED STATEMENT FOR REHEARING EN BANC 
I express a belief, based on a reasoned and studied 
professional judgment, that this appeal involves one or more 
questions of exceptional important: 
1. The preservation and protection of the right of 
American Indians to practice their traditional tribal religions, 
including their right to access to native sacred places, has been 
found and declared by Congress in ·the American Indian Religious 
Freedom Act,. 42 U.S.C. 1996, to be of utmost national importa)\lce. 
2. In this appeal, the Panel announced a new and dan-
gerously restrictive "centrality" standard to be used by this Cir-
cuit in a confusing and essentially uncharted area of the law 
under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 
3. Where a federal agency is permitted to unearth over 
,l,lOO Indian bodies and retain them in boxes indefinitely in the 
~~~c~ of claims of invidious racial discrimination without any ju-
' Jdicial scrutiny, this Circuit has abdicated its duties under Ar-
ticle III, Section 2 6f the Constitution of the United States. 
/ 
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Robert M. Stivers,. JrC> '· - '. . . -. ,.·~··, \.... .. ·•' 
Attorney of Record for 
Cherokee Appellants 
the 
The Cherokee plaintiffs (appellants here) request pur-
suant to Rule 35(b) and 40, F.R.A.P., that this Court enter an 
order to rehear or rehear en bane this appeal and the Panel's 
opinion decided and filed on April 15, 1980. As grounds, plain-
tiffs offer. the following points of law and fact which the Panel 
overlooked or misapprehended. 
In a two-to-one decision (Judge Merritt dissenting} the 
majority members of the Panel affirmed the dismissal of this ac-
ion by the district court for failure to state a cliam under the 
free exercise clause of the First Amendment. The Panel's reason 
for dismissing the action is different than that given the dis-
trict court.l/ Neither the Panel nor the district court discussed 
or gave any reasons for dismissing the equal protectiqn claim 
raised py the complaint herein as that claim relates to the dis-
interment of Cherokee bodies. 
In their complaint, the Cherokees alleged that the ac-
tions of the Tennessee Valley Authority (appellee here) in un-
earthing, removing and appropriating the remains of their rela-
tives and ancestors, together with their burial possessions and 
offerings, violated rights secured to the Cherokee by the First 
and Fifth (equal protection clause) Amendments (App. 8,9). The 
Cherokee further alleged that the area which will be unnundated 
by TVA contains many sites ,considered sacred by traditional Cher-
okees and which "have great significance to these plaintiff Cher-
okee in connection with their traditional religion, culture, and I 
1/ The district court's opinion is reported at 480 F.Supp. 608 ( E . D . Tenn . 19 7 9) . 
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way of life. 11 (App. 5.) The flooding of these irreplaceable 
holy sites, .the Cherokees alleged, 11 Will destroy the sacred sites 
and other holy places in violation of the rights recognized and 
guaranteed by the First Amendment." (App. 7.) 
-~· The district court granted TVA's motion to dismiss under 
· ~v>~ule l2(b) (6), holding that since the Cherokees have no property 
~·~~ lnterest in the land in question, they failed to state a free 
(/ v 
,'fltt ~/~)exercise claim ( 480 F. Supp. 612). For different reasons, the 
~)n~ Jl ..f Panel affirmed the district court, with one Judge dissenting. 
tJl'. / v. ,/. 
t/~-'tt-1 A' ~(0 The Panel's opinion is erroneous for two principal reasons. 
\~\~· First, it announced a standard for First Amendment protection 
' v/·~~ ~ ~ much stricter than that sanctioned by the Supreme Court, then (;) 
~v improperly made certain evidentiary findings about the nature 
of a religion which is previously unknown in prior decisional 
law, based solely upon affidavits, to hold that plaintiffs failed 
to meet the standard. Second, the Panel completely ignored the 
separate and distinct cause of action relating to TVA's treat-
ment of Cherokee bodies and alleged violations of equal protection. 
As will be discussed infra, rehearing is desirable for compelling 
reasons. 
I. THE CENTRALITY STANDARD IS ERRONEOUS AS THE GENERAL CRITERIA 
TO MEASURE THE LEGAL EFFICACY OF ALL FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS 
In this appeal the Panel undertook for the first time 
in this Circuit to set forth a general legal standard by which 
to determine the legal efficacy of claims based upon the free 
exercise clause of the First Amendment. In adopting the standard 
it did, the Panel so diluted the meaning of the free exercise 
clause as to render it a virtual nullity. Relying upon language 
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of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), Frank v. Alaska, 604 
P.2d 1068 (S.Ct.Alaska 1979), and People v. Woody, 40 Cal. Rptr. 
69, 394 P.2d 813 (1964), the Panel formulated a "centrality" 
standard to determine whether plaintiffs stated a constitution-
ally cognizable First Amendment right. under that standard only 
those religious beliefs or practices which play a central role 
in religious ceremonies (Woody) , are the cornerstone of religious 
observance (Frank), and are inseparable from one's way of life 
(Yoder) are claims which can be based on the free exercise clause. 
Lesser religious beliefs or practices, if they can be so classi-
fied, can not form the basis for cognizable First Amendment 
claims under the standard. 
While the "centrality" of a given religious belief or 
practice is certainly relevant when weighing the religious in-
terest agai~st that of the state in the compelling state inter-
est test, it is erroneous to apply that standard to determine 
the efficacy of the claim itself. 
The "centrality" standard was derived by the Panel 
primarily from a phrase in Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra. The Panel 
recited the phrase "the traditional way of life of the Amish is 
not merely a matter of personal preference but one of deep reli-
gious conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately 
related to daily living" (406 U.S. at 216), and adopted that 
language as the standard by which to measure the legal efficacy 
of the free exercise claims presented in this case. That phrase, 
however, was never intended as a general legal standard for de-
termining cognizable free exercise clause claims. Indeed, few 
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religious beliefs or practices would ever pass muster under a 
standard description of Amish religion. As the Supreme Court 
noted at 406 u.s. 236, the Amish showing in that case was one 
that 11 probably few other religious groups or sects would make. 11 
To require as a general standard that all religious claims 
under the free exercise clause constitute "deep religious con-
viction, shared by an organized group and intimately related to 
daily living" excludes many beliefs already held to be religious. 
In Yoder, the Amish claimed that the Wisconsin compul-
sory school attendance law violated their rights under the First 
Amendment. The Amish believed that attendance at high school 
was contrary to Amish religion and way of life. They were op-
posed to such attendance because it came at a critical time for 
their adolescent children's period of religious training. 
Thus, in Yoder, the Amish had the burden to prove that 
school non-attendance was religiously based conduct. In order 
to sustain that burden of proof, the Supreme Court held that 
they had merely to show something more than "subjective evalua-
tion and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted 
by the majority'' (216) to rest their claims on a religious 
basis. The Court stated: 
Although a determination of what is a 11 religious" be-
lief or practice entitled to constitutional protection 
may present a most delicate question, the very concept 
of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to 
make his own standard on ~~tters of conduct in which 
society as a whole has important interests. Thus, if 
the Amish asserted their claims because of their sub-
jective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary 
secular values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau 
rejected ... their claims would not rest on a religious 
basis. Thoreau's choice was philosophical and personal 
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rather than religious, and such belief does not rise to 
the demands of the Religious Clauses. 
406 U.S. 215-16. Applying that standard the Court then assessed 
the evidence adduced in that case and found that the Amish sus-
tained their burden of proof. The Yoder language adopted by the 
Panel merely summarized that evidence. Of Course, the Yoder 
Court then accorded those evidentiary findings great weight when 
applying the compelling state interest test to hold that the 
interests of the Amish outweighed those of Wisconsin. 
To buttress its 11 centrality" standard, the Panel re-
ferred to evidence adduced in Frank v. Alaska, 604 P.2d 1068 
(S.Ct.Alaska 1979). However, the legal standard used in Frank 
to determine the efficacy of a free exercise claim was much 
lower than that now espoused by the Panel: 
[a]bsolute necessity is a standard stricter than that 
which the law imposes. It is sufficient that the 
practice be deeply rooted in a religious belief to 
bring it within the ambit of the free exercise clause 
and place on the state its burden of justification. 
Id. at 1072-73. The language adopted by the Panel from Frank, 
like in Yoder, was not the legal standard used in that case but 
merely the language summarizing the evidence. 
The Panel also relied upon the evidence adduced in 
People v. Woody, 40 Cal.Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813 (1964), as op-
posed to any legal standards applied in that case. The evidence 
in ~oody has no bearing on a general standard to determine the 
legal efficacy of all free exercise claims. If only those re-
ligious beliefs or practices which constitute the "theological 
heart" of any given religion deserve First Amendment protection, 
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then most other deeply rooted religious practices will now be 
subject to infringement by Government at its whim.~ Such slen-
der protection would make it impossible to retain the semblance 
of any religions as they are presently known. 
In light of the Panel's standard, many protected prac-
tices are now endangered. The sale of religious literature, 
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1942), refusal to salute 
the flag, West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624 (1942), and opposition to Saturday work, Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U.S. 398 (1963), all seem so idiosyncratic that these beliefs 
could not qualify as free exercise claims in this Circuit. See 
also, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1945) (distribution of re-
ligious literature on private property constituted a free exer-
cise claim); Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1945) (proselytizing 
on federal property stated a free exercise claim); Follett v. 
McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1943) (tax on doing business was strick-
en when applied to sales of religious literature by a Jehovah's 
Witness, as a tax upon a free exercise right). 
The gradations between central and non-central reli-
gious beliefs are so infinitesimal and theologically complex 
that one legal standard can not safely draw such distinctions. 
Making theological distinctions of this nature has repeatedly 
been avoided by the Supreme Court. As stated by the late Justice 
Douglas in Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69-70 (1952): 
3_/ For example, in Woody, the Court found that peyote was more 
important to the Native American Church, than bread and wine 
sacraments in certain Christian churches. 394 P.2d 817. Does 
this mean that those Christian observances do not fall with-
in the ambit of the free exercise clause? 
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[a]part from narrow exceptions not relevant here [citing polygamy cases] it is no business of courts to say that what is a religious practice or ac-
tivity for one group is not religion under the protection of the First Amendment. 
See also, Presbyterian Church in United States v. Mary Elizabeth 
Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969) (dis-
putes on dogma); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1943) 
(judicial inquiry limited to questions of sincerity); United 
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (expansive definition of 
religion). Moreover, to the extent the Panel's standard is based 
upon the religious practices of one sect (Yoder), it constitutes 
religious preference contrary to the establishment clause. 
Where a belief or practice is rooted in religious be-
lief, it falls within the ambit of the free exercise clause. The 
significance or centrality of such beliefs to one's religion is 
relevant only as a factor in the compelling state interest test, 
and can only be assessed as a factual matter in individual cases. 
Thus, all the cases cited by the Panel were decided upon exhaus-
tive testimony presented at trial. There is no reason to treat 
this case differently. 
II. THE PANEL ERRED IN TREATING THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT AS ONE GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN FAILING TO REMAND TO PERMIT PLAINTIFFS TO OFFER PROOF 
After announcing its "centrality" standard, the Panel 
made evidentiary findings based on affidavits which were at-
tached to plaintiffs' motions for temporary injunctive relief. 
Several of those affidavits were written in the Cherokee language 
and translated into English with the assistance of interpreters. 
From this, the Panel was able to find: 
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Examination of the plaintiff's affidavits discloses 
no such claim of centrality or indispensability of 
the Little Tennessee Valley to the Cherokee religious 
observances. 
* * * 
It is a difficult and sensitive determination, how-
ever, we have looked at "the quality of the claims," 
as required by Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. at 215, and con-
clude that plaint1ffs have not alleged infringement of 
a constitutionally cognizable First Amendment right. 
(Slip Opinion, pp. 10-11.) Plaintiffs contend the Panel had an 
insufficient evidentiary basis for making those critical find-
in~s of fact, and that it was improper to decide those questions 
at this stage of the proceedings. The district court dismissed 
the action below on TVA's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6), 
in an opinion that nowhere mentions, cites or refers to anything 
outside the pleadings (480 F.Supp. 608). As Judge Merritt 
stated in his dissenting opinion: 
Indeed, the District Court simply held that the 
Indians have no free exercise claim because the Gov-
ernment now owns the land on which the burial sites 
are located. The District Court therefore did not 
explore, develop or find any facts concerning the 
role that this particular location plays in the 
Cherokee religion. 
(Slip Opinion, p. 13.) Moreover, a review of the hearing trans-
cript before the district court shows that TVA relied exclusively 
upon its motion to dismiss and admitted that certain issues of 
fact exist. (Transcript of Hearing, pp. 48-49, 54-56.)~/ 
TVA's motion can only be treated as one for dismissal 
under Rule 12(b) because the procedural requirements of Rule 56(c) 
3/ Where a movant fails to show or take the position that there 
is no "genuine issue of material fact," but rather relies 
solely on the pleadings, the motion is functionallv the same 
as and will be treated as a motion to dismiss. Marvasi v. 
Shorty, 70 F.R.D. 14, 17 (E.D. Pa. 1976). 
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were not adhered to. Rule 56(c) provides that summary judgment 
motions "shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed 
for the hearing." The procedural requirements of Rule 56 are to 
be strictly adhered to. Kistner v. Califano, 579 F.2d 1004, 1006 
(6th Cir. 1978). In Winfrey v. Brewer, 570 F.2d 761 (8th Cir. 
1978), the district court treated a Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dis-
miss as one for summary judgment, and dismissed the complaint. 
In reversing the dismissal, the Circuit Court held: 
We begin our analysis with the proposition that the procedural requirements of Rule 56 are to be 
strictly adhered to. Ailshire v. Darnell, 508 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1974). That rule provides that 
a motion for summary judgment "shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for hearing." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The purpose of this notice provision is to allow the opposing party meaningful 
opportunity to resist the motion by submitting 
counteraffidavits. 
* * * 
... absent notice of the district court's intention to treat the motion [to dismiss] as one for summary judgment, we are unpersuaded that a brief filed in 
response to a motion to dismiss represents the type 
of meaningful opposition contemplated by Rule 56. 
Id. at 764. Compliance with these procedural requirements are 
mandatory whenever the courts treats a Rule 12(b) (6) motion as 
one under Rule 56. Davis v. Howard~ 561 F.2d 565, 569, 571 (5th 
Cir. 1977); Torres v. First State Bank of Sierra County, 550 
F.2d 1255, 1256-57 (lOth Cir. 1977). In this case, TVA served 
their motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judg-
menton October 24, 1979, two days before the hearing of October 
26, 1979. This constitutes clear non-compliance with Rule 56(c). 
Because of TVA's lateness in serving its brief, plaintiffs had 
less than two days to respond. The district court then entered 
its decision on November 2, nine days after service of TVA's 
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motion. The treatment by the Panel of the district court's dis-
missal as one granting summary judgment under these circumstances 
is unfair and prejudicial, particularly where it announced a new 
standard and refused to remand the case. 
In his dissent, Judge Merritt urges that this appeal be 
reversed and remanded to the district court, "in order to give 
the Cherokees an opportunity to offer proof concerning the signi-
ficance and centrality of their ancestral burial grounds in light 
of the standard we have adopted." (Slip Opinion, p. 13.) This 
appeal involves a religion which is unknown in prior decisional 
law. That unwritten religion is virtually unknown to any non-
Cherokee and attaches great religious significance to certain 
beliefs and activities which society generally regards as non-
religious. It is all too easy to trod upon a minority religion 
of this nature where all the facts are not in the record. For 
example, the Panel stated the rule that affidavits are to be 
examined in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and then 
proceeded to do the exact opposite by interpreting the affidavits 
d . d h . . . 4/ . h . . th accor lng to Ju eo-C rlStlan notlons.- Wlt out revlewlng e 
record of live testimony, plaintiffs submit the Panel was unable 
to determine the religious significance of certain areas in the 
4/ With respect, plaintiffs assume that the Panel members are 
conditioned or subscribe to the Judea-Christian tradition, 
which is God-centered and places great importance on "wor-
ship" of the deity as the heart of the religious experience. 
Reverence for the land and unity with nature are not ''cen-
tral" to that tradition. What the Panel failed to grasp is 
that Cherokee religion is vast~ ~iff~rent from the Judea-
Christian tradition in that Cherokee religion, as alleged 
below, places great significance on tenets regarding nature, 
respect for the land and reverence for certain tribal holy 
places. 
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Little Tennessee River Valley to the Cherokee race. Such testi-
mony would likely have to be adduced through the assistance of 
English language interpreters at trial. Of all religions in 
this country, only the indigenous tribal religions place great 
significance to certain holy places located on this land. This 
fact has been well-noted by Congress in two recent laws. The 
American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. 1996, is at-
tached hereto. In Sections 4(c), 4(g), 5 and lO(a) of the 
Archeological Resource Protection Act of 1979, P.L.96-95, 93 
Stat. 721, Congress afforded significant protections for Indians 
against harm to "religious or cultural sites" caused by archeo-
logical excavations on public lands, and required the Secretary 
of the Interior to implement the Act by a set of uniform rules 
which "may be promulgated only after consideration of the provi-
sions of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (92 Stat. 469); 
42 U.S.C. 1996) ." Yet these fundamental acknowledgements by 
Congress will go unprotected unless the courts are able to un-
dertake the sensitive and complex task of adducing and assessing 
evidence on the nature of tribal religious claims from the per-
spective of their meaning to Indians. As Congressman Udall stated: 
For many tribes, the land is filled with physical sites 
of religious and sacred significance to them. Can we 
not understand that? Our religions have their Jerusa-
lems, Mount Calvarys, Vaticans and Meccas. We hold 
sacred Bethlehem, Nazareth, the Mount of Olives, and 
the Wailing Wall. Bloody wars have been fought be-
cause of these religious sites.~/ · 
~/ Cong. Rec. HG872 (1978) (daily ed. July 18, 1978)_ (Remarks 
of Rep. Udall, Co-Sponsor of the American Indian Religious 
Freedom Act Bill) . . 
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Under the liberal rules of notice pleading, plaintiffs were not 
required to plead evidence, Fannie Chamberlain Mfg. Co. v. 
Derry Div., 445 F.Supp. 65, 76 (W.D.Pa. 1977); it was enough 
that they made allegations which, accepted as true, appear in 
paragraphs 2, ll, 15 and 17 of the complaint. (App. 2 , 5 , 7 . ) 
Any doubts must be resolved in favor of the plaintiffs. In 
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam), the court re-
versed and remanded the dismissal of a Buddhist's First and 
Fourteenth Amendment complaint, "even though the allegations of 
the complain~ are on the borderline necessary to compel an evi-
dentiary hearing." (405 U.S. 322, Concurring Opinion.) See 
also, Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964); Kennedy v. Meachum, 
540 F.2d 1057 (lOth Cir. 1976); Taylor v. Gibson, 529 F.2d 709, 
716 (5th Cir. 1976). 
III. THE PANEL OVERLOOKED OR IGNORED THE SEPARATE EQUAL PRO-TEC'I'ION ISSUES RAISED IN THE COMPLAINT CONCERNING TVA'S DISINTERMENT AND DETENTION OF OVER 1,000 CHEROKEE BODIES 
As noted by amici Indian Tribes, "The disinterment and 
desecration by TVA of more than one thousand Indian bodies con-
stitutes the largest atrocity committed by federal agents against 
an Indian tribe within recent memory.".§/ In the complaint, the 
Cherokees alleged that the above actions by TVA violated rights 
secured to them by, inter alia, the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, and requested specific relief on 
this issue. (App. 8-10.) It is well settled that, "the Equal 
.§./ See page 3 of Amici Curiae Memorandum of Points of Authori-tles in support of Appellants' Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal, submitted by the Sioux and Zuni Tribes and a number 
of Indian and Native Hawaiian groups, and filed by the Clerk 
on December 14, 1979. 
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Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is applicable to 
the federal government through the medium of the Fifth [Amend-
ment] ," Moreno v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 345 F.Supp. 
310, aff'd, 413 U.S. 528, 533 n.5 (1973), and that the "court's 
approach to the Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has al-
ways been precisely the same as equal protection claims under 
the Fourteenth Amendment." Weinberger v. Weinsenfeld, 420 U.S. 
636, 6?8 (1975). See also, Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 
(1974); Marshall v. United States, 414 .U.S. 416, 422 (1973); 
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 81 (1971); Bolling v. Sharpe, 
347 u.s. 497 (1954). 
Before this Court, TVA admitted that it has disinterred 
1,140 Indian bodies, but claimed that only 185 are Cherokee, and 
then attempted to justify its retention of those bodies in the 
face of Cherokee claims of disparate racial treatment.I/ TVA has 
disinterred and retained Cherokee bodies, in stark contrast to 
its treatment of the remains of white Americans. This facially 
disparate treatment based solely on race has resulted in harm to 
plaintiffs and infringement upon their religious beliefs relating 
to Cherokee respect for the dead. Plaintiffs are entitled to 
sustain these allegations by proof at trial and to offer evidence 
showing TVA's actions are racially motivated under the criteria 
of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-
268 (1977). 
7/ See page 6 of Memorandum of Defendant Appellee in Opposition 
to-Motion of Plaintiff-Appellants for Injunction Pending 
Appeal, and attachments (undated); and the Cherokees' Motion 
for Injunction Pending Appeal, dated November 29, 1979. 
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In its motion to dismiss below, TVA did not address 
this equal protection claim, and it was ignored by both the dis-
trict court and the Panel in their respective opinions. 
Plaintiffs have alleged a cognizable claim under the 
equal protection provisions of the Fifth Amendment, and it was 
error to dismiss that claim solely because of the Panel's hold-
ing with respect to plaintiffs' free exercise claim. Such error, 
astoundingly, has permitted TVA's actions to escape judicial 
scrutiny. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on April 28, 1980, he 
served appellee Tennessee Valley Authority with two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing, by mailing the same, United 
States mail, postage prepaid to: 
Hebert S. Sanger, Jr. 
James E. Fox 
General Counsel 
Tennessee Valley Authority 
Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 
